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Abstract 
European executives largely agree that American op-
erators of online platforms dominate online business 
in the EU.  There is less consensus on the reasons for 
American domination and on the possible economic 
consequences of this domination for the growth of EU 
business, for employment, for the strength of the EU 
economies, or for the national security of individual 
EU member states.  With a series of interviews with 
German executives in a range of industries we exam-
ine opinions of the causes of American domination of 
the net, the current consequences, and the potential for 
future economic harm.  We develop a set of hypothe-
ses, which can be examined with a larger survey and 
with econometric analysis. 
1. Introduction 
European online infrastructure is largely controlled by 
a small number of American giants, which operate 
large networks and consumer-focused extensible plat-
forms. Google’s Android platform dominates mobile 
computing.  Amazon does not yet dominate all shop-
ping, but it has the dominant online shopping platform 
and is extending this platform to offer convenient 
smart home management, including voice-based shop-
ping.  Facebook is the dominant social networking 
platform, and indeed in much of the world it is the only 
social networking platform of any significance.  And 
the market for cloud services is shared among Ameri-
can giants Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and 
Salesforce.  Microsoft also continues to dominate the 
traditional desk-top platform, though it has not been 
able to dominate any aspect of online infrastructure 
and is not a factor outside of cloud services. 
Does this matter?  Is this American domination of 
platform-based consumer-focused infrastructure im-
portant?  It clearly appears significant to the European 
Commission, which has recently imposed a third fine 
on Google for abuse of monopoly power with its An-
droid platform [28]. 
How would we as academic researchers in infor-
mation systems economics and strategy assess the sig-
nificance of American domination of consumer-fo-
cused platform-based web services?  Does it affect 
economic growth in the EU?  Does it affect EU em-
ployment?  Does it affect national security?  Why did 
it happen?  And, if indeed it does matter, what are the 
appropriate responses?  What, if anything, should be 
done? 
Our research methodology for this paper reflects 
its position as the first, exploratory study in a larger 
multifaceted study that will entail hypothesis testing 
with surveys and econometric analysis.  Our research 
methodology in this paper begins with ethnographic 
studies, a small set of in-depth semantically rich inter-
views intended to allow us to develop our hypotheses.  
This paper is part of an ongoing research effort.  The 
limitations of this paper and of the first stage of our 
study are addressed in a section on limitations.  The 
next steps required to complete our analyses are re-
viewed in a section on future research. 
2. Historical Context and Motivation  
In an uncertain world, some industries have always 
been considered essential to national security.  In 1904 
First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher was concerned that if an-
other European War were to occur, Britain would des-
perately need battleships.  Battleship turrets were the 
most complex machinery of the era.  He knew that if 
he stopped Purchasing battleships in 1904, he might 
have no remaining source of turret technology outside 
of Germany.  Although Fisher considered Germany an 
ally in any future European conflict, battleship tech-
nology was too critical to entrust to any ally, and 
Fisher made expensive and unpopular commitments to 
the defense industry to preserve the necessary capabil-
ity within Britain [19].  One might argue that internet 
technology and platform technology are as important 
today as naval capability was before the First World 
War. If President Trump can argue that aluminum and 
steel are so critical to national defense that competing 
companies in Europe, China, and Canada cannot col-
lectively be trusted to meet US national security re-
quirements [31], then clearly Europe can argue that in-
ternet technology is essential today.  Similarly, Presi-
dent Trump has argued that US jobs in coal, steel, and 
aluminum [9] are so essential to the US economy that 
they are worth protecting on national security grounds. 
Surely EU countries can argue that it is worth protect-
ing at least some participation in the most profitable 
industries in today’s economy. 
We are not the first academic authors to address 
American domination of the net.  A conference paper 
on the same themes was presented in Berlin in 2016 
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[8]. But this paper is the first step we have seen to-
wards an integrated academic study of the problem. 
Likewise, we are not the only authors addressing 
how to proceed to mitigate the domination of the net 
by American platforms.  A coalition of German indus-
trial firms has been studying and writing about how to 
respond [32]. Their proposal is to form a cross-indus-
try coalition with its own portal, so that German con-
sumers could have a German identity. That is, German 
consumers could log into future consumer-focused 
websites using a German login, instead of using the 
Facebook or Google or Amazon logins.  It is not yet 
clear how this would mitigate any of the risks of Amer-
ican domination.  Individuals do not use Facebook or 
Google or Amazon solely so that they have an ID to 
log into other systems, and consumers will continue to 
use Google to search, Facebook to hang out with 
friends online, and Amazon to shop.  This proposal 
does not address the domination of American plat-
forms in those areas.  Again, we believe that our paper 
is the first step towards an integrated academic study 
of the extent of the problem and the first attempt at 
developing a strategy for responding. 
3. Review of the Role of Semantically 
Rich Case Studies 
Perhaps the most important proponent of using ethno-
graphic observation and semantically rich case studies 
for the generation of testable hypotheses is [13].  
Moreover, others have explored the significance of 
such studies specifically in the field of information 
systems research; see, for example, [20] and [3].   
 We feel that the questions we are asking are im-
portant, but that we are not yet ready to conduct more 
formal research.  Until we are certain we are asking 
the right questions and asking all of the right questions, 
it is premature to conduct large surveys to explore the 
answers to those questions.  Until we know whether 
executives believe that economic harm has occurred, 
and until we know what factors executives believe are 
significant or what sectors have been affected, it may 
likewise be premature to begin our statistical analyses. 
[21] provides moral support for assessing importance 
before conducting our formal research.  
In the development of any field or discipline, there 
comes a period where 'respectability' insidiously 
reigns. ... Subtly, choices are made which pro-
foundly affect the field:  methodological rigor and 
precision become prized over phenomenological 
significance, researching over scholarship, con-
ceptual edifices for scientists only, and reification 
over elucidation. [21, p. 5] 
 We do expect to have statistical significance in the 
later elements of our study of American domination of 
the net in Europe.  However, [22] reminds us that sta-
tistical significance alone is not sufficient.  It does not 
provide an explanation of causal mechanisms, and 
thus does not provide corroboration of theories.  More-
over, statistical significance alone does not provide 
guidance for strategic responses: 
[T]he finding of statistical significance is per-
haps the least important attribute of a good ex-
periment:  it is never a sufficient condition for 
concluding that theory has been corroborated, 
[nor] that a useful empirical fact has been estab-
lished with reasonable confidence. ... The value 
of any research can be determined, not from the 
statistical results, but only by skilled subjective 
evaluation of the coherence and reasonableness 
of the theory, the degree of experimental control 
employed, the sophistication of the measuring 
techniques, the scientific or practical importance 
of the phenomena studied, and so on. [22, p. 158-
159] 
 Even earlier, [18] defends the essential, indeed 
foundational role of subjective, qualitative data in ty-
ing together empirical research: 
Qualitative data and analysis function as the glue 
that cements the interpretation of multimethod re-
sults.  In one respect, qualitative data are used as 
the critical counter-point to quantitative methods. 
[18, p.609]  
 More recently, information systems researchers 
have published case studies that were used to develop 
theories, which we subsequently explored and tested 
by others. See for example, [6], who used the case 
study of Capital One to formulate the theory of newly 
vulnerable markets.  The same authors then used a 
later, larger study of Capital One, after it had expanded 
into other lines of business, to test the theory [7].  Their 
use of Capital One was selected because it provided a 
natural experiment, consistent with the philosophy of 
[13] and [20] for using case studies.  Subsequent stud-
ies by other authors have also used case studies in in-
formation systems to test the theory of newly vulnera-
ble markets; see, for example [15]. 
4. The Historical Role of Platforms 
and of Platform Envelopment 
The recent attention to the platform revolution [23] 
suggests that platform operators have gained power 
only recently, and that platform envelopment as a form 
of monopoly power may be quite recent.  The most 
obvious example of a platform-based strategy and the 
ability to develop monopoly power is Google and the 
development of Android, described more fully below.   
The most recent case resolved by litigation was 
the American Department of Justice complaint against 
Microsoft for bundling features like Internet Explorer 
into their Windows operating system, pre-installing 
Internet Explorer, and creating interoperability prob-
lems for Netscape. 
But the problems proposed by extensible technol-
ogy platforms and by the use of platform envelopment 
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strategies to gain monopoly power have existed for 
decades.  For example, AT&T operated the first com-
mercially successful radio station, WEAF, in New 
York in 1922.  The Federal Radio Commission, the 
precursor to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, was concerned that since AT&T was the only op-
erator of long distance telecommunications in the US, 
AT&T could deny other operators of radio stations the 
technology they needed to create multi-station net-
works, by denying them the ability to transmit signals 
over land lines to remote locations for rebroadcast.  
The Commission therefore forced AT&T to choose 
between operating a commercial radio station or oper-
ating its telephony business, effectively ending their 
platform envelopment strategy [34]. 
5. Motivation and Propositions, 
Used to Generate Hypotheses 
Our initial expectations when starting this study were 
that American firms had earned billions of Euros mon-
etizing private and personal information, in ways that 
were illegal for European firms.  This gave American 
firms an incentive to enter markets that European 
firms did not have.  Google’s advertising business is 
its largest revenue source, and it is largely based on 
revenue streams from monetizing information based 
on individual customers’ search history, email, GPS 
data, and numerous other sources.  Facebook’s largest 
revenue stream likewise comes from monetizing pri-
vate information from its billions of users.  Since there 
are no effective European competitors, these Ameri-
can giants enjoy near-monopoly power in the EU. 
Additionally, we expected that American firms 
then used their core businesses to develop platform en-
velopment strategies [14, 23, 24], leveraging their near 
monopolies to dominate other business sectors.  
Google used revenue from paid search to develop An-
droid.  It used the Mobile Application Distribution 
Agreement (MADA) to control placement of applica-
tions on all Android devices [11, 12].  The control cre-
ated by the MADA gave Google the power to deter-
mine which apps could succeed, and which apps could 
not succeed in Europe.  Indeed, abuse of the Android 
platform to obtain unfair (monopoly) advantage is the 
basis of the most recent 2018 EU Competition Com-
mission’s complaint against Google [29]. 
Google is not alone in leveraging power in one 
core area to develop a powerful platform with a plat-
form envelopment strategy.  Amazon has used its 
domination of online sales to develop massive control 
over online books, and Apple has used its domination 
of online music sales to support very aggressive pric-
ing models in its negotiations with music publishers, 
though neither of these appear to approach full mono-
poly power. 
The creation and defense of a sequence of monop-
olies clearly violated both European and American an-
titrust law, and was the basis of the Department of Jus-
tice’s successful litigation against Microsoft in 1998 
[4]. See complaint: [33].  And yet, the courts’ under-
standing of monopoly power in a platform envelop-
ment strategy is less mature and less complete than the 
understanding of monopoly power in more traditional 
settings, especially in manufacturing. 
Thus, our expectation was that the revenue source 
created by monetizing private information, when skill-
fully combined with leveraging initial monopoly posi-
tions to develop subsequent platform-based monopo-
lies, would be widely seen as the basis of American 
domination.   
6. Description of Recent Major 
Privacy Violations  
Table 1 (at end) lists 49 major incidents of privacy vi-
olations as reported in the global mass media.  The in-
cidents occurred over the past eight years, and they 
originated almost equally within the US and outside 
the US.  The references to the source material used to 
create these tables will be available online as Appen-
dix A, which includes 52 articles obtained from pub-
lished news reports.   
As we expected, the bulk of the reported incidents 
were against American firms.  The vast majority, 40 
out of 49 incidents or 82%, were against American 
firms.  When formal complaints are examined the ratio 
is even more striking, with 25 out of 26, or 96% of 
complaints filed against American firms.  Addition-
ally, further examination indicated that many of these 
privacy violations were of economic, competitive, and 
strategic importance to these American firms.  Not sur-
prisingly, we found that a slight majority, 17 of 28 or 
61% of the formal complaints were filed in the EU.  
Again not surprisingly, we found that the EU, and Ger-
many in particular, were more likely to impose some 
form of punishment, with 13 out of 22 or 59% of pen-
alties imposed in the EU.  Finally, and not surpris-
ingly, the vast majority of penalties, 21 out of 22 or 
95%, were imposed against US firms. 
Although we were able to substantiate empirically 
the role of monetizing privacy to create massive reve-
nue streams that were not available to European firms, 
as described below our interviews did not show that 
executives shared our beliefs in the importance of ei-
ther privacy violations or antimonopoly violations as 
the principal source of American companies’ online 
power.  It was necessary to develop a more compre-
hensive explanation for the domination of the net in 
the EU by a small number of American platform oper-
ators. 
7. Results of Our Interviews 
In June of 2018 we conducted 10 interviews with ex-
ecutives or officers in 8 organizations, including finan-
cial services, software services, manufacturers of con-
sumer appliances, manufacturers of heavy industrial 
equipment, automobile manufacture, and the German 
military.  All of these interviews were with German 
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firms, which is a serious limitation that will be ad-
dressed in subsequent studies.  While the EU is in-
tended to function as a single market, it is not clear that 
all European executives face the same problems or 
have the same reactions to them. 
      Our interviews showed that our initial assumptions 
were far too simplistic, at least as an explanation of the 
beliefs of our German interview subjects.  The results 
of our interviews are summarized below.  We reported 
all of the answers suggested by our interview subjects; 
we list them by our subjective assessment of the 
strength of the subjects’ beliefs and of the frequency 
with which individual ideas were suggested by differ-
ent executives. 
7.1. Why do American firms dominate the 
net in Europe? 
American firms faced a single market with a single 
regulatory regime while European firms faced frag-
mented markets with different national preferences, 
different languages, and different regulatory regimes.  
American firms were able to gain economies of scale 
quickly, which allowed them to achieve positive net-
work effects and to achieve economies of scale on de-
velopment and operating expenses. 
American firms entered first, and achieved network ef-
fects and economies of scale first simply because of 
first mover effects.  The American firms were lucky 
enough to enter first, capture the market first, learn 
about consumer preferences first, and their advantage 
is a result of a lack of initiative among German com-
panies when considering online opportunities. 
American venture capital firms are more familiar with 
speculative ventures in information systems and have 
a more sophisticated attitude towards risk.  German 
venture capital firms avoided losses, and most specu-
lative ventures do fail.  American firms managed their 
portfolios and were seeking 20X returns on a few win-
ners.  While German firms were avoiding losses and 
avoiding speculation, American firms were content to 
lose their investments 90% of the time, since if they 
achieved 20X 10% of the time they would still be dou-
bling their money quickly. 
American entrepreneurs and executives had different 
attitudes towards risk and towards public disapproval, 
and were willing to risk legal censure or public disap-
proval.  German firms avoided anything that was not 
yet known to be legal and acceptable to the public.  
American firms risked anything that had not been 
shown to be illegal, or had not yet been successfully 
prosecuted as illegal.  This is also supported by tables 
1 and 2.  American firms were also more willing to risk 
public disapproval.  As Google CEO Eric Schmidt de-
clared, his job was to understand what the public con-
sidered creepy, and to take Google as close to the 
creepy line as possible.  “There is what I call the 
creepy line. The Google policy on a lot of things is to 
get right up to the creepy line and not cross it.” [26] 
American firms benefited from lax enforcement of pri-
vacy law in the US and lax enforcement of privacy law 
against US firms operating in Europe.  While this was 
suggested by some executives late in their interviews, 
it did not receive nearly the degree of significance we 
anticipated when planning our studies. 
American firms were able to implement platform en-
velopment strategies because of lax enforcement of an-
titrust law in the US and antimonopoly law in the EU 
or because of outdated antitrust law in the US and an-
timonopoly law in the EU.  While this was acknowl-
edged as potentially significant when we suggested it 
during our interviews, it was not volunteered or sug-
gested by any interview subjects as a significant cause 
of the domination of the net by American platform op-
erators. 
7.2. Is the American domination of the net 
significant in any way? 
Yes, because this domination represents domination by 
a few giant platform operators with near monopoly 
power in their respective spheres of influence.  The 
fact that the firms are all American is not significant. 
Yes, because this domination represents lost profits, 
which are earned by foreign firms and not EU firms.  
The repatriation of profits represents a significant drag 
on or tax on the economies of European nations. 
Yes, because this domination represents lost employ-
ment opportunities within the EU.  Almost all employ-
ment in internet giants is employment by American 
firms. 
Yes, because the cost of paying for services from mo-
nopoly platform operators may be excessive.  
Google’s charges for keywords is already a significant 
tax on commerce in the EU, and Amazon has the 
power to demand significant rebates from European 
firms that wish to sell to their consumers in their home 
market. 
Yes, because American firms’ lax attention to social 
norms allows fake news to prosper, which represents 
a threat to the functioning of democracy. Facebook’s 
role in the manipulation of public opinion before the 
2016 presidential election [1, 25], and its manipulation 
of public opinion before the Brexit vote [30], are both 
significant examples. 
Yes, because European firms will have fewer opportu-
nities to expand in the future than their American 
counterparts.  Future online applications will increas-
ingly require integration into existing platforms, and 
European firms would systematically be denied access 
while applications developed by the platforms them-
selves would dominate.   future ops 
Yes, there are significant threats to the national secu-
rity of all members of the EU.  The one military office 
we spoke to said that the current situation was cer-
tainly grounds for concern.  He argued that national 
security concerns existed any time key infrastructure, 
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any key infrastructure, was operated entirely by for-
eign companies.  He also believed that the risks were 
exacerbated as American culture and American inter-
ests appeared to be diverging rapidly from those of the 
EU. 
No, Domination by a small number of American plat-
forms does not matter at all.  One interview subject 
said, in essence, the following.  We are a global firm.  
We obey all the laws of all the countries in which we 
operate.  Our competitors do as well.  While we may 
face threats from competitors that understand the use 
of the net for customer support better than we do, we 
are not affected by Google, Facebook, Amazon, or 
other firms.  We sell to giant industrial firms and to 
national governments; our customers do not search for 
sellers through Google, do not look on Facebook pages 
to make their purchasing decisions, and do not pur-
chase on Amazon. 
7.3. Will American domination of the net be 
significant in the future? 
Yes, domination by a small number of American plat-
forms will become more significant in the future as a 
result of the increasing importance of the internet of 
things.  More functions in the home will be integrated 
into platforms operated by American firms, especially 
Google Home and Amazon Alexa. These firms will 
exclude EU partners and will extend their own plat-
form capabilities and their own domination. 
Yes, EU retailers and manufacturers of small home ap-
pliances will have to pay significant fees to the Amer-
ican platforms for access to their own consumers.  
This is analogous to the high fees that some sellers to-
day have to pay for positioning in search. 
Yes, American operators of extensive platforms al-
ready have much more experience integrating func-
tionality and managing complexity, and will provide 
better and more complete customer experience than 
any single EU firm or even any single EU industry.  
No individual European firm, and no single European 
industry, will be able to provide the level of function-
ality and the level of convenience offered by American 
platform operators.   
Yes.  As American platform operators gain power and 
their presence becomes more universal under the in-
ternet of things, national security concerns will be-
come even more severe.  American platform operators 
may be able to sabotage European homes, European 
roadways, and European manufacturing.  This is exac-
erbated by trade wars and by the diverging cultural 
values of European and American societies. 
No.  German industry is already forging intra-industry 
alliances, such as the cooperation among automobile 
manufacturers.  As a result, they will be able to provide 
smart car-to-car and car-to-road management, smart 
train-to-train and train to track and train to mainte-
nance schedule management, and will be able to do so 
without need for any American intermediation. 
7.4. Impact of the New General Data 
Protection Regulation 
What impact will the new General Data Protection 
Regulation have on the balance between EU and 
American firms and how will it affect the power of 
currently dominant platform operators? 
None.  It is already too late for EU firms to recover 
their competitive position. 
Positive.  It will limit platforms’ ability to commit pri-
vacy abuses in the future, which will level the playing 
field at least partially. 
Positive.  It will increase transparency, so users will 
be concerned if their data are abused.  It will permit 
transportability, so users who are dissatisfied with the 
way their data are used on Facebook can, in theory, 
easily migrate along with their friends to a new com-
peting website that provides a “cleaner” service. 
Negative.  EU firms will be held to even stricter stand-
ards while US platform operators will continue to ig-
nore local regulations. 
8. Hypotheses 
We developed five hypotheses as a result of our inter-
views.  We developed a sixth hypothesis when we 
planned how we might further explore whether the re-
sults of executives’ beliefs, as expressed in surveys, 
were reflected in company performance, as reflected 
in econometric data. 
 We note that it would be bad research design to 
attempt to test six hypotheses with ten data points.  
However, in this paper we are not testing any hypoth-
eses.  We did generate our six hypotheses from con-
versations with only ten individuals, but these conver-
sations averaged over an hour, and there was ample 
opportunity to explore a large number of topics.  These 
topics were then reduced to six hypotheses. 
 We also note that all of our initial interviews were 
with German executives, and that our hypotheses all 
make statements about European executives.  This is a 
serious limitation, which will be addressed in two 
ways in subsequent phases of the study.  We will con-
duct interviews in other EU countries.  And we con-
duct our surveys in enough EU countries to examine 
national differences in the responses we receive.   
Hypothesis H1:  European executives in all industries 
are aware of American domination of net-based busi-
nesses. 
Hypothesis H2:  European executives in all industries 
are concerned about American domination of net-
based businesses. 
Hypothesis H2A:  European executives whose busi-
nesses require consumer interaction for retail sales are 
extremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H2B:  European executives whose busi-
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nesses require selling software to individuals are ex-
tremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H2C:  European executives whose busi-
nesses require distributing consumer-focused software 
through to individuals through online platforms are ex-
tremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H2D:  European executives whose busi-
nesses require selling cloud-based services to corpora-
tions are extremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H2E:  European military officers are ex-
tremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H2F:  European executives whose busi-
nesses require intense interaction between their com-
panies and their consumer products after sales are ex-
tremely concerned. 
Hypothesis H3:  European executives do not agree on 
the causes of American domination of net-based busi-
nesses. 
Hypothesis H3A:  Some European executives believe 
American domination is due to advantages resulting 
from selling into a single market. 
Hypothesis H3B:  Some European executives believe 
American domination is due to first mover advantages. 
Hypothesis H3C:  Some European executives believe 
American domination is due to a greater appetite for 
risk among venture capital and private equity firms. 
Hypothesis H3D:  Some European executives believe 
American domination is due to a greater willingness to 
skirt the limits of the law or the limits of enforcement 
of the law. 
Hypothesis H3E:  Some European executives believe 
American domination is due to lax enforcement of pri-
vacy laws, lax enforcement of antimonopoly law, gaps 
in monopoly law, or some combination of these fac-
tors. 
Hypothesis H4:  European executives do not agree on 
the future impact of the internet of things. 
Hypothesis H4A:  Some European executives believe 
that the internet of things will create new problems for 
manufacturers of products that require interaction be-
tween the company and their products after sale, be-
cause giant platforms are better positioned to control 
interactions with consumers. 
Hypothesis H4B:  Military officers believe that the in-
ternet of things will create new national security prob-
lems, due to the loss of control of critical infrastruc-
ture. 
Hypothesis H4C:  Some European executives believe 
that the internet of things will create no new problems 
for them, because their companies or their industries 
will be able to respond effectively. 
Hypothesis H5:  European executives do not agree on 
the way forward, or on the nature of appropriate re-
sponses to American domination of the net. 
Hypothesis H5A:  Some European executives believe 
that it is too late for any effective response. 
Hypothesis H5B:  Some European executives believe 
that better privacy regulation and better enforcement 
under the GDPR may help reduce the dominance of 
American platform operators. 
Hypothesis H5C:  Some European executives believe 
that the transparency and transportability control of-
fered by the GDPR may help reduce the dominance of 
American platform operators. 
Hypothesis H5D:  Some European executives believe 
that clarification, modernization, and enforcement of 
antitrust law may help reduce the dominance of Amer-
ican platform operators. 
Hypothesis H5E:  Some European executives believe 
that cooperation within their industries may provide 
meaningful alternatives to existing platforms and thus 
may help reduce the dominance of American platform 
operators. 
Hypothesis H6:  The impact of American platform op-
erators’ domination of the net can be measured. 
Hypothesis H6A:  Traditional European chemical 
companies like AGFA and heavy industrial manufac-
turers like Siemens are performing at their traditional 
levels and have not yet been affected. 
Hypothesis H6B:  Traditional European service firms 
like Allianz and Deutsche Bank are performing at their 
traditional levels and have not yet been affected. 
Hypothesis H6C:  Traditional European retailers are 
starting to show the impact of competition from online 
sellers. 
Hypothesis H6D:  Software vendors like SAP are not 
affected in their traditional businesses but are unable 
to expand into areas like cloud services. 
Hypothesis H6E:  The EU equivalents of Giant pure 
internet companies like Google and Facebook are to-
tally absent, and app developers are surviving only at 
the fringes and cannot compete successfully in critical 
areas like mapping or mail.  
9. Limitations of Our Current Research 
We see six limitations in our current research, all of 
which will be addressed in the subsequent stages of 
our research program. 
• The first and most obvious limitation is the fact that 
all of our subjects were German executives.  This 
would be a problem if executives in other major 
EU economies face a different set of problems. 
• The second limitation is a result of the small size 
of our initial sample [5, 27]. While a ten interviews 
may be enough to identify the set of critical issues, 
it is certainly not enough to identify their relative 
importance. 
• Interviewer bias may be significant [2, 17].  We 
have our own expectations about how the net-
based economy works and about how platform in-
dustries operate.  We may have unconsciously led 
or subjects in directions that we expected them to 
follow, or we may have unconsciously interpreted 
their comments in ways that supported our expec-
tations. 
• Recency bias may be significant [10, 16].  The new 
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General Data Protection Regulation had gone into 
effect days before our interviews and may had 
caused viewers to see privacy violations as a 
greater contributor to American domination than 
they would have previously.  Alternatively, the im-
plementation of the GDPR or may have led sub-
jects to see the problem of privacy violation as 
more completely solved than they would have seen 
it before and thus as a less significant element in 
the domination of the net by American platform 
operators. 
• Other, well-known effects may be significant, such 
as participant bias.  Often in experiments where 
subjects are paid they seek to “to a good job” and 
they attempt to guess what the experimenters want 
to observe and then try to respond accordingly.  
That is not likely to be a factor here, but there is 
still a possibility that subjects may have attempted 
to cooperate and may have attempted to provide the 
answers we expected.   
• Finally, while attitudinal studies will help us under-
stand why certain effects may have occurred, they 
cannot demonstrate that they have indeed already 
occurred.  Attitudinal studies complement econo-
metric analyses, but they cannot substitute for 
econometric analyses. 
10. Future Research — Addressing The 
Limitations of Our Current Research. 
Our future research has three key elements.  First we 
will conduct a additional interviews with executives in 
France, Britain, and Denmark, to learn if there are ad-
ditional issues we should have included when con-
structing our hypotheses.  Next, we will survey a broad 
executives in different positions, and in a wider range 
of industries, in Germany and elsewhere in the EU.  
We will also include government officials, industry as-
sociations, and military officers in our survey.  This 
survey will specifically address our attitudinal hypoth-
eses.  We will determine if these executives believe 
that there is a problem with the domination of the net 
by American platform operators.  We will determine, 
for those executives who do believe that there is a 
problem, what they believe the causes were. 
Finally, we will conduct econometric analyses to 
determine where EU firms have demonstrably suf-
fered adverse effects that could be explained by Amer-
ican domination of the net. Even if we can demonstrate 
harm we will not have established causality of course. 
But we will have demonstrated that there are economic 
effects that are consistent with the beliefs of European 
executives, and that are at least correlated with the ef-
fects of American domination of the net. 
11. Summary and Contributions 
We feel that the topic of control of online infrastruc-
ture is vitally important.  As trade in services becomes 
more important, and as international trade disputes are 
increasing, it is important to understand the extent to 
which domination of the net by American platform op-
erators does or does not affect the EU economy.  We 
believe that our interviews have enabled us to create a 
set of testable hypotheses, which makes a modest con-
tribution to our understanding of this phenomenon.  
While there is universal agreement among our inter-
view subjects that the net is dominated by American 
operators of platforms, there was little consensus on 
causes, effects, or appropriate responses.  Our survey 
will allow us to assess the perceived relative im-
portance of different factors, as causes, as impacts, and 
as responses. 
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Location of 
Firm 
Incidents Reported   Formal Complaints   Penalty Imposed 
In US In EU In US In EU In US In EU 
US 21 19 10 17 8 13 
EU 6 3 1 0 1 0 
Table 1.—Analysis of incidents of privacy violation, formal legal and regulatory complaints, and 
punishments, comparing US and EU firms from 2010 through 2018. 
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